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Naval warfare has changed dramatically from the days of 
wooden ships to the high-tech force of the modern United 
States Navy. Some of the changes occurred through 
incremental or evolutionary processes, but other changes 
have been revolutionary. 
In this period immediately following the Cold War, 
there is uncertainty over future roles and missions in the 
U.S. Armed Forces, because our principal rival has 
diminished in power. Yet, the United States Navy has 
embraced a revolutionary strategy in which the maritime 
forces look to shoreward instead of seaward. 
In peacetime, tremendous opportunities exist for 
militaries to innovate and plan for future wars while free 
of imminent threats. During this period of change and and 
potential innovation it is useful to examine similar periods 
in history for lessons that will suggest how innovation may 
be successfully accomplished today. Many successful 
innovations described in the literature occurred during 
periods of peace and constrained resources, much as the Navy 
finds itself today. 
Numerous models exist that seek to explain how military 
innovation occurs, but no single model explains all cases of 
innovation. Three models are presented as differing views 
of how military innovation occurs. First, Vincent Davis 
showed that innovation usually begins with a mid-grade 
officer who finds a better way of doing something. Next, 
Ronald Kurth reported that there are many institutional 
constraints on innovation in the Navy, but not on efficiency 
improvements. To enact a major innovation, a maverick 
zealot is necessary. Finally, Steven Peter Rosen offered 
multiple models for different conditions. In peacetime, 
innovation occurs because military men construct a vision of 
lX 
what the next: war will be like, and how innovations will be 
effective in winning it. Then they take the necessary steps 
to accomplish .1.t. Rosen also concluded that technological 
innovation lS a special case. He said technological 
innovation occurred primarily to manage uncertainty. When 
military officers are faced with uncertain conditions, they 
turn to sources outside the military to provide solutions. 
Military innovation is being driven and encouraged by 
many of today's civilian and military leaders, but although 
guidance and direction are being provided from the top, the 
outcome is uncertain. Innovations undertaken, or not 
undertaken, and the success of such innovations during this 
period of relative peace will affect the Navy's role in 
future conflicts, and may shape future conflict itself. 
The innovation process can be enhanced by a better 
understanding of the politics involved. Military 
organizations seem willing to innovate so long as it does 
not disrupt anything, but true innovation is almost certain 
to be disruptive. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has 
embraced a revolutionary strategy. It is too early to tell 
whether the innovation in strategy will result in a 
revolutionary doctrine. No other changes undertaken in the 
last several years are seen as truly revolutionary, however, 
there are innovations being contemplated such as, unmanned 
aircraft taking over some manned-aircraft missions, which 
could have as broad impact as the Navy's decision to 
integrate aviation before World War II. 
If the Navy's current littoral focus proves to be more 
than a passing trend, the Navy must focus resources, and 
ensure a viable career path exists for junior officers to 
succeed in the new field of littoral warfare. 
The current Revolution in Military Affairs envisions 
battle environment with near real-time, near-perfect 
knowledge available to commanders; perhaps a new generation 
X 
of cheap, smart, stealthy missiles e.g., "Super Tomahawks" 
that will do shore bombardment better and more cheaply than 
aircraft; and wings of stealth aircraft protecting fleets 
and ground forces. 
Will the RMA succeed? As with all innovation, success 
or failure depends on the emergence of advocates or zealots 




Peace has been declared. . . . What a fix we are in now! 
N. Bonaparte(l802) 
The last decade has been a tumultuous one for the 
United States armed forces. A decade ago, America was 
building up its military, and equipping it with the most 
advanced and modern hardware that the world has ever seen. 
Simultaneously, U.S. military forces achieved unprecedented 
levels of education, training and competency. At, or near, 
the peak of that buildup America's principal rival, the 
Soviet Union collapsed. 
With the shriveling of the Soviet Empire and the loss 
of the United States' principal potential adversary, the 
U.S. military is now downsizing, transforming, and thinking 
through the new roles it may play in the post-Cold War era. 
In the 1991 Gulf War, the first major post-Cold War military 
engagement involving U.S. troops, the public got a glimpse 
of the power of American military forces equipped with 
modern weaponry. It was the world's first exposure to what 
some are calling a military-technological revolution (MTR), 
or a revolution in military affairs (RMA), that is, a 
revolution in the way the U.S. military employs forces and 
wages combat. 
It is in this environment of downsizing and 
transformation, while perched at the brink of a revolution 
in military technology and its application, that the U.S. 
Navy finds itself today. In recent years the Navy has taken 
specific steps to meet the challenges of this new 
environment. It has shifted from the open-ocean naval 
strategy expressed in the 1986 document, The Maritime 
Strategy, to a littoral focus explained recently in the Navy 
white paper, .From the Sea. The Navy has also begun 
development of a formal written doctrine, under the aegis of 
1 
a newly-for~ed Naval Doctrine Command, to pair with its new 
strategy. 
As the U.S. military's budget declines, the Navy's 
leaders are challenging naval personnel to innovate. In a 
speech delivered in April 1994 to open the Current Strategy 
Forum, Secretary of the Navy, Dalton used the words 
"innovative" and "innovation" 32 times. 1 These events, 
while not fully integrated, signal tremendous change for the 
Navy, and raise many questions concerning the Navy's future. 
In peacetime, tremendous opportunities exist for 
militaries to innovate and plan for future wars while free 
of imminent threats. During this period of change and 
innovation it is useful to examine similar periods ln 
history for lessons that will suggest how innovation may be 
successfully accomplished. The purpose of this paper is to 
present ideas by which today's naval leaders might benefit 
from lessons previously examined by other authors of 
military or naval innovation. 
Several contemporary authors have written about the 
politics of innovating within the Navy. More than twenty 
years ago, Vincent Davis,? and retired U.S. Navy Rear 
Admiral Ronald Kurth,' wrote about innovations undertaken in 
the Navy during the World Wars and the early Cold War years 
(up to the 1960s). Using several U.S. Navy and Marine 
Corps' innovations as examples, Steven Peter Rosen laid down 
precepts for successful military innovations in his 1988 
:John W. Hashek, "Navy strategy session in R.I. uneasy with Clinton 
policies," Boston Globe, 17 June 1994, p. 20, cited in Bradd C. Hayes, and 
Douglas V. Smith, eds., The Politics of Naval Innovation, Strategic Research 
D~partment Research Report 4-94, (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 1994), p. 
101. 
~Vincent Davis. The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navv Cases, 
Honograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Denver: University of 
D~nveJ:, 1967). 
;Ronald James Kurth, "The Politics of Technolooical Innovation in the 
United States Navy," doctoral thesis (Cambridge, HA:- Harva1d University, June 
1970) . 
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article, "New Ways of War. "4 Rosen later expanded this work 
to several distinct types of military innovations in a 1991 
book, Innovation and the Modern Military: Winning the Next 
War.c More recently, U.S. Naval Reserve Captain Philip W. 
Signor wrote about the successful introduction of cruise 
missiles into the Navy." And in 1994, the Naval War College 
published a series of papers addressing the politics of 
naval innovation. 7 
Using case studies these authors described the 
difficulty in implementing truly revolutionary innovations. 
All agree that making evolutionary changes by improving 
efficiency is far easier than implementing truly innovative 
or revolutionary change, especially when new equipment is 
required. Many successful innovations described in the 
literature occurred in peacetime when budgets were tight, as 
is the case in the Navy today. With that in mind a number 
of questions arise. 
- Do the changes taking place in the U.S. Navy today 
qualify as innovations, or are they merely methods of making 
the Navy more efficient and better able to accomplish 
existing missions? 
- Most authors on military innovation concluded that 
great technological innovation does not automatically 
translate into success in battle for the innovator's armed 
forces. What can and should the United States Navy be doing 
now to ensure that today's innovations succeed? How can the 
"steven P. Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," 
International .Studies, 13 (Summer 1988): 134-168. 
·steven P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern 
Hilitary, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
'Philip W. Signor, "Cruise Missiles for the U.S. Navy: An Exemplar of 
Innovation in a Military Organization," (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 
1994) . 
See Hayes and Smith in note 1 above. 
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Navy take full advantage of the tremendous technology 
available today in the United States to truly revolutionize 
its thinking and operations? 
- Although the U.S. military possesses great 
technological advantage over potential adversaries, military 
innovation is not limited to the introduction of new 
technologies and equipment. New concepts, ideas, and 
strategies must also be added for major--even revolutionary-
-innovations. The U.S. Navy today is publicly committed to 
two of the innovations specified in the first page of this 
thesis--a new doctrine, and a new strategy. The question 
is, will they succeed? 
- The Navy's new strategy, Forward . .From the Sea, 
places the focus away from the Navy's traditional blue-water 
emphasis toward the littoral, and support of operations 
ashore. The likely success of the new strategy hinges on 
transforming Cold War thinking and hardware designed for 
open-ocean warfare with the Soviets to new missions. The 
new strategy must be followed-up with concrete innovations 
in doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for the 
shift to be fully effective. Innovations undertaken, or not 
undertaken, and the success of such innovations during this 
period of relative peace will affect the Navy's role in 
tuture conflicts, and may shape future conflicts themselves. 
Does it appear that the Navy is taking the necessary steps 
to ensure that the new strategy will succeed, or is the Navy 
merely providing a new strategy to satisfy Congress and 
other outsiders who seek more joint oriented services? 
This thesis will attempt to address some of these 
questions by examining the actions taking place in the Navy 
today and applying the lessons of successful innovation 
described by Rosen and others. 
4 
II. MODELS OF MILITARY INNOVATION 
The central concern of this thesis is how to make the 
availability of new technologies combine with innovative 
thinking and actions to bring about a genuine revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) for the U.S. Navy. Using past 
studies of innovation in the U.S. Navy, what generalizations 
about successful innovation can be derived and applied today 
to ensure that the Navy maximizes benefits from the RMA? 
Research for this project has been guided by the works 
of several authors. In particular, the writings of Vincent 
Davis, Ronald Kurth, Stephen Rosen, Barry Posen, Philip 
Signor and the team at the Naval War College who produced 
the report The Politics of Naval Innovation, have influenced 
this work.' This chapter summarizes key conclusions from 
three major studies of naval innovation. 
Vincent Davis' work will be presented first. His The 
Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases is the first 
study of contemporary naval innovation. Ronald Kurth 
focused specifically on internal and external politics with 
respect to technological naval innovation. His work is 
presented second. Stephen Rosen's Winning the Next War: 
Innovation and the Modern Military is the most exhaustive 
study of U.S. military innovations to date. He developed 
'The theory of military innovation put forth by Barry Rosen in The 
Sources of Militarv Doctrine: France, Britian, and Germanv Between the World 
Wars is not proposed as a model for current naval innovation. Posen's theory 
essentially argues that military innovation comes from outside the military 
th1·ough civilian intervention. No major innovations in the U.S. Navy have 
supported Posen's thesis, and it is unlikely that new naval innovations will 
occur primarily as the result of civilian intervention either. 
Philip Signor wrote an excellent history of the cruise missile in the 
U.S. Navy. His paper includes many lessons concerning naval innovation. 
Several of Signors's insights are included in the analysis section of this 
pape1·. 
The Politics of Naval Innovation contains case histories of the 
introduction of cruise missiles into the Navy and the development of Aegis 
technology. Both cases were compared against models presented by Davis, 
Poser,, and Rosen. Conclusions from the study are included in the analysis 
section of this paper. 
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separate models for a variety of conditions. His work is 
presented at the end of this chapter. 
A. DAVIS' MODEL OF MILITARY INNOVATION 
Vincent Davis' studies of the Navy's efforts to develop 
the capability to deliver nuclear weapons by carrier 
aircraft, the development of nuclear propulsion plants, the 
development of fleet ballistic missiles and several pre-
World War II improvements led him to conclude that 
innovation generally requires an innovation advocate, most 
often found in the middle ranks--Lieutenant Commander, 
Commander, or Captain. 2 This advocate is seldom the 
inventor of the innovation that he promotes, but he usually 
possesses "a uniquely advanced technological knowledge 
pertinent to the innovation that is not generally shared 
within the Navy."' Davis observed that the innovation 
advocate is a passionate zealot--a man who "tolerates least 
well inefficiencies of any kind . If there is a better 
way to do it, he is determined to see it done the better 
way. oo4 
There are drawbacks to becoming the passionate zealot 
that Davis describes, although the advocate himself often 
does not seem to care. According to Davis, "the innovation 
advocate seldom pays any attention whatever to the ways ln 
which his crusading efforts may influence his personal 
career in the Navy or elsewhere."" Davis observed that 
success or failure in implementing the innovation does not 
"Davis, Politics of Innovation, 33. 
'Ibid., 34. 
~Ibid. 
'Ibid .. 35. 
6 
equate to career success or failure. Some are eventual 
winners, but many are losers. 
Although Davis identified specific advocates for the 
innovations he studied, they did not bring about innovations 
unassisted. "The advocate's first step is usually to try to 
enlist supporters from among friends and colleagues at his 
own rank level." b The advocate's next step, whatever the 
success of the first, is to recruit supporters in key 
positions of authority and power at higher levels. Davis 
found that this vertical alliance is essential to the 
success of the effort. 
In the cases Davis examined, he found that the advocate 
seldom sought allies or support from outside the Navy, 
preferring to settle disputes "in house." He concluded that 
the "pro-innovation coalition seldom seeks to sell its idea 
in terms of new conceptions . . On the contrary, the usual 
gambit is to try to sell and justify the proposed innovation 
as a better way to perform some well-established Na~ task 
or mission." 7 
Davis hypothesized that while an innovation may have 
extensive consequences, advocates are either untrained "in 
the kind of intellectual operations required for political 
or strategic analyses, "8 or the "advocates may have been 
instinctively aware that an innovation tends to result in 
changes within an organization, but that it would be easier 
to sell the innovation to the organization if the scope and 










Davis al3o observed that most innovations had 
opponents, and reported on the techniques of the innovation 
opponents as well. Unlike the innovation advocate, the 
"counter-alliance" usually emerges first at the senior rank 
levels and builds strength by finding members at gradually 
lower rank levels. 10 The most commonly used weapon that the 
counter-alliance uses against the pro-innovation coalition 
is that "it will cost too much." The counter-alliance does 
not want to be perceived as anti-progress, hence the "costs 
too much" argument. Decades ago, the "costs too much" 
argument was employed against adopting a particular 
innovation. More recently, the "costs too much" argument 
has been used against the costs of even exploring the new 
initiative.:: Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
although not specifically a Navy project, was attacked in 
this manner. 
Perhaps the most interesting of Davis' observations is 
that neither the pro-innovation, nor the counter-alliance 
group, makes its case on the long-range implications and 
consequences for international politics and competitive 
military strategies. Arguments were not framed in terms of 
enemy capabilities, unless the innovation was proposed 
specifically to cope with a specific threat. 12 
Davis identified inter-service rivalries as another key 
source of innovation. In the afterthoughts section of his 
monograph, Davis stated the hypothesis that he argued in The 
Admirals Lobby; :• the emergence of the U.S. Air Force as a 
separate military service drove the other services, 
:'Ibid. 
; :Ibid. I 3 8-39. 
:_Ibid., 39. 
:'Vincent Davis, The 1\d.mirals Lobbv (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1967), 213-47. 
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especially the Navy, to compete with it. He argued that 
both the Air Force and the Navy believed that the other used 
World War II to put the other out of existence. He 
concluded that naval officers perceived the Air Force as a 
direct threat to the continued existence of the Navy, and 
therefore felt compelled to produce rival innovations to 
compete with the Air Force in order to survive as a 
prominent part of the U.S. armed forces. 14 
Although a civilian political scientist with no active 
duty experience, 15 Davis observed some key traditions within 
the Navy representing a culture favoring innovation. 
Specifically, he noted a naval tradition emphasizing 
"improvised expeditious solutions rather than prescribed 
procedures when confronted with a task." lv In contrast, an 
Army man might take a more procedural approach and ask 
himself: "what do the rules and regulations say about 
dealing with this sort of matter?" 17 Depending on the 
answer to this question, the situation would be very 
carefully defined and specified then assigned to some staff 
group for discussion and recommendations. 
Davis found, "in the Navy, on the other hand, tasks are 
viewed as things to be done in the quickest and most 
efficient manner rather than formal problems to be 
staffed." 1• Naval officers are inculcated from their 
earliest days of naval service to take action to get the job 
done, to be creative, persistent and imaginative--in short, 
1;Davis, Politics of Innovation, 39. 
15Davis spent nearly a decade from the late 1950s through the mid-1960s 
studying the U.S. Navy. He had frequent and regular access to active duty 
naval officers of various ranks who spoke with him both on and off the record. 
'"Davis, Politics of Innovation, 42. 
:'Ibid. 
9 
to think. Most naval officers can recall being taught the 
story of "A Message to Garcia, " 19 a story in which a Marine 
Officer during the Spanish-American war is instructed to 
deliver a message to Garcia. The officer must overcome a 
series of obstacles to deliver the message, the first of 
which is finding out who Garcia is and where he is likely to 
be found. 
Davis quoted a senior naval officer who, after reading 
an early version of his monograph, remarked 
"When an officer or an enlisted man in the Navy is 
assigned a task, he seldom thinks about consulting 
'the book' but rather goes into immediate action 
to get the job done. Indeed, he seems especially 
pleased if he can think of shortcuts that ignore 
the 'book' solution." 28 
Davis concluded that the Navy's approach to tasks 
favoring improvised and expeditious solutions over 
elaborately considered solutions based on prescribed 
procedures is pragmatic, and has likely served as a catalyst 
for innovation in the Navy. 
'"The essay, "A Message to Garcia," was originally published in 1899. 
The author of the essay was Elbert Hubbard. A recent article regarding the 
stor~' can be found in "Ah, Sir, .Zl.bout That Message to Garcia . . . , " by Jack 
Herlocker, (LT), U.S. Navy, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedinas, 113 (July 1987), 
98-99. 
>Davis, Politics of Innovation, 42. 
10 
B. KURTH'S MODEL OF MILITARY INNOVATION 
As a junior officer, Rear Admiral Ronald Kurth wrote 
his doctoral thesis" 1 about the politics of innovating 
within the U.S. Navy. In the introduction to his thesis, he 
described what he perceived as significant technological 
innovation taking place outside the military while, at the 
same time, the Navy was failing to meet its needs for 
technological innovation. He saw naval innovation as 
haphazard, and perceived a need for more information 
concerning the process of technological innovation. He 
wrote, "the certainty that the Navy must achieve more 
responsive technological innovation provides the motivation 
to continue the search for a better understanding of the 
innovative process." 23 Although nearly twenty-five years 
have passed since Rear Admiral Kurth wrote his doctoral 
thesis, scholars and America's armed forces still seek a 
better understanding of the process of innovation in the 
military. 
Kurth surveyed historical naval innovation, and then 
researched two innovations in great detail--the genesis of 
nuclear power for submarines, and the development of the 
POLARIS fleet ballistic missile system. Besides chronicling 
the two cases, Kurth made important contributions to the 
literature on military innovation by explaining political 
elements in the process of innovation. Kurth, like many 
naval officers of that era, was clearly influenced by the 
writings of Vincent Davis whose books Postwar Defense Policy 
and the U.S. Navv, 1943-1946, and The Admirals Lobby, and 
monograph, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navv 
- Re.:n- .l\dmiral Kurth received his Doctor of Philosophy in Political 
Science from the Government School at Harvard University in 1970. His 
doctor.:tl thesis is entitled, "The Politics of Technological Innovation in the 
United States Navy." 
~-rzurth, 1. 
11 
Cases, were published in 1966 and 1967. Whereas Davis 
described the process by which innovation advocates or 
zealots advanced their cases by arguing a better way of 
doing essentially the same task or mission, Kurth wanted to 
look at what he called "innovative departures." 23 He 
described an innovative departure as a "radical departure 
from the technology supporting existing weapons systems. "24 
Incremental innovations, on the other hand, are the 
small things that the services do "which adds a new 
dimension of usefulness to an existing weapons system." 25 
They help to steady and focus the organization by improving 
it and making it more efficient. Proponents of incremental 
innovations are often seen as "rocking the boat," but their 
innovations do not threaten to sink the boat. On the other 
hand, advocates of an innovative departure are nearly always 
viewed as trying to sink the boat. The distinction is 
perhaps more readily apparent to a military officer because, 
in Kurth's words, "the authors of incremental innovations 
are much appreciated and well rewarded by the Navy." 2 b 
Kurth observed that innovative departures are difficult 
to implement because they destabilize the organization "by 
endangering the usefulness of a weapon system around which a 
military life style is built."- He cites the nuclear 
submarine as an example for two reasons: first, because the 
new technology condemned the conventional submarine force to 
obsolescence; and second, because Admiral Rickover generally 
"''Ibid., 2. 
·"Ibid. 
-'''In his thesis, "Politics of Technological Innovation" (2), Kurth 
provided examples including "the change from hydraulic to the steam catapult, 
from the landing signal officer to the mirror landing system, and from the 




denied transition to the nuclear program to those in the 
conventional submarine hierarchy. 28 
Both Kurth and Davis observed that the politics of 
incremental innovation are comparatively free of conflict. 
Yet Kurth concluded the politics of innovative departure are 
likely to be complex. 20 Advocates of innovative departures 
are rarely rewarded and are frequently discredited or 
ostracized by their own service. 
Political resolution of conflict generated by the 
destabilizing effect of a successful innovative 
departure is usually necessary. The Congress can 
be expected to play an influential role in the 
innovative process and contribute to the 
resolution of conflict within the Navy or among 
the services. ' 0 
In each innovation that he studied,' 1 Kurth identified 
an innovation advocate who became what he termed a zealot.'" 
Politics sometimes meant that the zealot would receive 
sufficient "encouragement to sustain motivation but not 
enough support to gain action."" 
In contrast to Davis, Kurth found an institutional 
resistance to change in the Navy due to the way it is 
organized. He concluded that the Navy is optimized to 
administer and perform routine tasks; as such, it has 
··Ibid. 
: In his thesis, "Politics of Technological Innovation" ( 3), Kurth uses 
th.;- t~1·m politics to describe "all of the means by which advocates of 
innov,:ltion attempt to influence policy in order to obtain a commitment in 
support of the innovation." 
''Ibid., 3-4. 
'·In addition to the introduction of nuclear power propulsion, and the 
Pola1·is System into the U.S. Navy, Kurth covered (in far less detail) W.S. 
:;ims' gunne1·y improvements, Regin.:tld Henderson's (Royal Navy) convoying, and 
Billy Mitchell's quest for air power. 
-navis also called innovation advocates zealots although Davis did not 
differentiate b~tween incremental innovation and innovative departures. 
·'Kurth, 11. 
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difficulty adapting to change. Kurth observed that military 
bureaucracies emphasize tradition, stability, "loyalty, 
trained habit and confident attachment to existing 
instruments of warfare." 34 Perhaps the difference between 
Kurth's and Davis' view on this matter can be partially 
attributed to Davis' lack of active duty experience in 
contrast to Kurth's. As an active duty naval officer, one 
can clearly see, and observe firsthand, the rigid 
bureaucratic aspects of the Navy, and at the same time not 
realize how less rigid and bureaucratic the Navy is compared 
with other services. 
Kurth observed that the different methods the Navy used 
in applying technological innovation were not reflected ln 
the literature. "Frequently, an oversimplification is made 
which lumps together all aspects of innovation in one 
conceptual basket, when in fact there are large differences 
among attempts at technological innovation. "15 He observed 
that the Navy's record for incremental innovation goes 
unnoticed "because attention is focused on innovative 
departures which occur only by persevering against great 
difficulty."''· Great human efforts and triumphs make more 
interesting reading, and when authors document these 
struggles the Navy's rich history of successful 
technological innovation appears distorted. Kurth concluded 
that the literature on military innovation describes 
interesting innovative departures to illustrate the 
difficulty of innovating in service bureaucracies, while in 
~Ibid. 
'Ibid., 44. 
'nibid, 44-45 • 
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reality, incremental innovation occurs at a high rate, and 
innovative departure is slow, difficult, and less cornrnon. 37 
Kurth postulated that since incremental innovation is 
so much easier to achieve, naval innovators often try to 
adapt a radical innovation by an incremental 
which the introduction of the new innovative 




consistent with Davis' observations about the method 1n 
which advocates seek support for their projects. 
Kurth's study of the U.S. Navy from the turn of the 
century until the late 1960s revealed that "this process [of 
attempting innovative departures incrementally] has become 
less possible after the mid-century point.",., Kurth does 
not elaborate on this point; however, he may have drawn that 
conclusion because at that time the rapid pace of 
technological progress was driving more rapid military 
innovation.'" 
1. Challenges to True Innovative Departures 
Although there are many challenges that the innovative 
zealot faces, Kurth identified key factors that he found 
were central and common to the difficulties of innovative 
technological departures in the Navy. Two factors will be 
lCibid. 1 45. 
J 'Man~· authors have addressed the subject of the increasing pace of 
technological progress and its impact on militaries. In general, they 
conclude that technology is changing so rapidly that militaries are 
nec:essa1:i ly d1·i ven to incorporate new technology more quickly. See Alvin and 
Heidi Toffler, h'ar and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New 
York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), Martin van Creveld, Technoloav and War 
From 2000 B.C. to the Present (London: Brassey's (UK), 1991), also van 
Creveld's The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), Matthew 
Evangilista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the 
Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca: Cornell University 
P1·ess, 1988), and John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. 
Enopf, 1993) . 
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examined here. The first is loyalty, the principal and 
governing value in the navy style of life. The second lS 
the Navy belief that the military ethic must remain 
apolitical. 40 
Kurth reported, naval officers are loyal not only to 
service, but also to their subunit and/or community. The 
"problem" of loyalty in innovation is illustrated ln the 
following excerpt from a letter to the U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings in 1965 by a recently retired Navy Captain: 
Each service has its own honorable 
traditions: its esprit de corps. These attract 
promising young men to dedicate their lives to a 
career of service which they consider worthy of 
respect, and perhaps leading to glory. The 
service is the avenue to promotion and 
recognition. If a change in world politics, 
technology, tactics or strategy (and changes come 
rapidly these days) threatens the relative 
standing of one of the services, what happens? 
The service cannot attract good young men, the 
prospect of recognition dissipates, and the 
service maintains itself with difficulty. No 
senior officer who has dedicated his life to the 
country through his branch of the service is going 
to accept the threat lightly. In addition to his 
own aspirations, the officer carries on his 
shoulders the weight of those who have preceded 
him in honorable service, as well as the future of 
all the young careerists he has inspired to look 
toward the future in that service. 
Although it may be unconscious, a consequence 
of the service system is a tendency to oppose 
blindly and utterly any tactical or strategic 
development which might be foreseen, even dimly, 
as a threat to one's own service. Accepting the 
diminution of one's own service role may be 
military professionalism on a high level, but it 
may also betray a lack of appreciation for the 
system which provides the next generation of 
leaders . .;: 
''Ibid., 48-51. 
~Lincoln A. Baird, CAPT, USN (Ret.), U.S. Naval Institute Proceedinas, 
91 (.July 1965), 106-0':, quoted in Kurth, 54. 
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Kurth expanded Captain Baird's view of service loyalty 
to include community loyalty. He observed that, in the 
navy, community loyalty dominates service loyalty. Thus, a 
fighter pilot may view himself as part of the Navy's 
"tacair" (tactical aviation) community first, and a part of 
the carrier Navy second, and as a Navy man third. This 
loyalty to subunit is effective in motivating service 
members to pursue higher subunit performance and may 
"precipitate even stronger locally-oriented 
professionalism. " 42 Kurth concluded, "subunit 
identification may become a more dominant force than any 
other. " 4 ~ As a result, Navy-wide organizational goals such 
as "keeping the peace" may translate (at the subunit level) 
into "keeping the carriers." Thus Kurth concludes, "the 
decentralization of primary loyalty among subunits may 
produce a hostile response to internal attempts at 
change." 44 Kurth postulated that even the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) is not immune to challenges should he 
threaten or challenge subunit loyalties. 45 
Despite the strong subunit identification that Kurth 
observed, Navy loyalty overrides subunit loyalty in the face 
of challenges from outside the Navy such as, perceived 
challenges from the Air Force for missions being performed 
by the Navy. Strong subunit loyalty helps perpetuate a 
system where innovative departures considered within the 
larger organization will be vigorously opposed by the 
members of the subunit whose existence is being threatened. 
In Samuel Huntington's classic The Soldier and the 









that must be "non-dated and non-localized . . a constant 
standard to judge the professionalism of any officer corps 
anytime anywhere. "46 Kurth identified a relationship 
between the apolitical military ethic and loyalty. 
Such an ethic is held to be free and uncorrupted 
by the transient nature of the instant's politics. 
Since loyalty is the heart of the military ethic, 
loyalty must be free of a transient, politically 
based definition, or risk the destruction of the 
military ethic. 47 
Herein resides a fundamental conflict according to 
Kurth. He pointed out that the military ethic is, to a 
certain degree, guarded by mechanisms to keep it free of 
politics, and yet through his case studies he concluded, 
"without politics an innovative departure is unlikely. 
Hence a desire to preserve the 'purity' of the military 
ethic serves to restrict the realization of an innovative 
departure. " 4 '' 
2. Characteristics of the Innovation Zealot 
Given the adversity that innovative zealots face, where 
do the services find innovation zealots? Kurth examined the 
careers of particular innovation zealots, and identified 
some telling characteristics. 
One type of zealot, typified by W. S. Sims, was 
languishing at junior rank, and saw innovation as a form of 
escape and adventure. 4 " In Sims' case, improvement in 
gunfire was only the first of the many innovations he 
·'".S.;tmuel P. Huntington, The .Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), 62, quoted in Kurth, 49. 
,~1\urth, 49. 
'In 1901, when he began to press for improvements in naval gunfire 
systems, .Sims was a forty-three year old Lieutenant. 
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championed. He developed a dedicated passion for 
innovation. Sims could not adjust to complacency or 
mediocrity, and he never did. 50 
Another type of zealot may restrain himself, and go on 
quietly in his career, appearing to support the status quo 
until he acquires experience, and accumulates enough rank 
and power to express his plan for change. 51 Kurth did not 
elaborate on the purpose or methods of this zealot. He did 
however, point out that high rank alone does not guarantee 
success of a given innovation. In fact, he concluded "it is 
unlikely that [even] the Chief of Naval Operations could 
perform, only by virtue of his own will, an innovative 
departure." :.:o 
A third type of innovative zealot "is developed from 
the officer who perceives conflict between the needs of his 
country and the norms of his service." 01 This type of 
zealot often has normal "service-based" loyalties that 
become overtaken by the pursuit of a higher cause. Kurth 
names both General Mitchell (USAF) and Commander Henderson 
(RN) as probable zealots of this type. He wrote, 
each had a conventional dedication to their 
service until such time as a greater loyalty 
seemed called upon. Indeed, each might have 
claimed that his actions were based on a clearer 
perception of service loyalty."·~ 
The last type of zealot that Kurth identified is 
modeled on the examples of Admirals Rickover and Raborn. 
Kurth devoted a large section of his thesis to their careers 
'·Kurth, 64. 





and their innovative departures. Both Admiral Rickover and 
Admiral Raborn were initially unenthused with the idea of 
becoming a zealot, however they eventually became passionate 
in pursuit of their programs--nuclear propulsion for Admiral 
Rickover and fleet ballistic missiles for Admiral Raborn. 
Rickover and Raborn became what would later be called 
program managers. 
Kurth believed zealots were mavericks. His description 
of Admiral Rickover caused this reader to conclude that 
Rickover was a maverick. 
Admiral Rickover, at different times, found 
himself in conflict with the Submarine Force, the 
Navy and the Defense Department. Furthermore, 
Admiral Rickover's formal and informal channels to 
Congress are well defined in the public record of 
Congressional commit tees. :• 
Raborn and Rickover were exceptional men. Kurth observed 
the combination of creative or innovative talent and tact 
are rarely coincident in the same individual. "If an 
individual is an independent thinker, a source of new and 
different ideas, he is likely to be rather independent in 
his dealings with other people. He is not likely to be 
orthodox in conduct and to conform graciously." s<. Kurth 
reported that "some innovators, if judged by their actions, 
seemed convinced that tact is deleterious to the awakening 
effect desired in the conflict surrounding innovation ... ·-
Today, we might describe this talent as "media savvy." 
Admiral Rickover was judged capable of being sensational in 
his public statements to rouse the public to exert pressure 
'''Ibid., 83. 
·Lewis I\. Dexte:::, "Some Strategic Considerations in Innovating 
Leadership," in Alvin~- Gouldner, ed., Studies in Leadership (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1965), 592, 598, cited in Kurth, 383. 
'Kurth, 383. 
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on senior naval officials to recognize the need for his 
innovation. "· 8 
While proponents of incremental innovation are rewarded 
handsomely for "extending weapons system usefulness and 
conserving funds, " 5 " Kurth observed that zealots' careers 
suffer because the effort required to cause an innovative 
departure takes the zealot "out of the mainstream of 
organizational life by the demands of an innovative project 
whose complexity requires years of attention. " 60 Naval 
officers cannot generally afford years selling an innovation 
at the expense of rounding out one's career. The officer 
who remains loyal to an innovative departure is likely to 
"pay the price to his promotion selection board." 
Therefore, the system exerts conservative control over 
innovation. 
It is a rare individual who will persevere in the face 
of great challenge, knowing that his actions will probably 
hurt his career prospects and opportunities. Admirals 
Rickover and Raborn both achieved flag rank, but the costs 
were enormous. For every Rickover or Raborn there are 
dozens of men whose careers have been damaged, and they, 
along with their idea, fade away. 
Kurth acknowledged that there are probably other types 
of innovators in the militaDr but he leaves it to others to 
discover and chronicle their experiences. 
3. How do True Innovative Departures Succeed? 
A key to the success of an innovative departure is 
strong leadership, usually exercised by one man 





innovate successfully, the zealot must have 
resilience and inner strength to accept for 
himself an environment of pressure and conflict. 61 
In addition to the zealot's inner drive, he must develop 
political allies to protect himself and his program. Kurth 
concluded that "the navy accomplishes innovative departure 
only with outside political assistance. "62 because the Navy 
lacks the internal means to resolve the conflict generated 





C. ROSEN'S MODELS OF MILITARY INNOVATION 
Steven Peter Rosen has written extensively about 
innovation in the modern military.b4 His 1991 book Winning 
the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military described 
two types of military innovations: behavioral (or social) 
and technological. Behavioral innovations are those 
hastened by operational behavioral changes. Changes due to 
the creation of new military technologies, e.g., guided 
missiles, radar, electronic warfare, and so on Rosen labeled 
technological innovations. He further differentiated 
between two classes of operational behavioral innovations, 
those that occurred in peacetime and those that occurred in 
war. To address these differences Rosen developed separate 
models for innovation during peacetime and wartime, and 
those that resulted from new technologies. 65 
During his research Rosen encountered numerous cases of 
failure to innovate, but decided to direct his energies 
toward understanding successful innovation since he found 
there was already a vast literature on bureaucratic inertia 
in the military. He understood the need to study and 
explain successful military innovation."' 
In Rosen's examination of the American armed forces he 
found far more cases of successful innovation than failures. 
~here failures were found in U.S. cases, the failures 
typically resulted from a failure to innovate rather than a 
failure of the intended innovation. For that reason, he 
"~Unlike other authors who studied one or two, or at most, five cases of 
innovation, Rosen's book Winnina the Next War: Innovation and the Modern 
Militarv (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), contains the results of 
his research into twenty-one innovations, including both successes and 
f .. 1.ilm:es. 
"~'Rosen, Hinning, 5. 
"'Ibid. 
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examined cases of failed innovations drawn primarily from 
the British military. 
The cases Rosen used to illustrate his models of 
innovation were both revolutionary and highly successful. 
They were very important to their respective services. In 
fact, Rosen first chose the innovation he believed 
represented the most important decision undertaken to that 
point in a particular service's history. h' For example, 
Rosen examines the U.S. Navy's decision to integrate carrier 
aviation into a battleship navy, the U.S. Army's adoption of 
helicopter airmobility, and the U.S. military's adoption and 
integration of technological advances such as guided 
missiles, proximity fuses, and radar. Where he chose other 
less important innovations, it was to test other theories of 
innovation.bt He chose to exclude innovations aimed at 
increasing efficiency. ha 
Like Kurth, Rosen was interested in major innovations, 
. a change in one of the primary combat arms of a 
service in the way it fights or alternatively, the creation 
of a new combat arm. " 70 Rosen also drew the distinction 
between tactical innovations and major innovations. 
Tactical innovations involve the change in application of an 
individual weapon to a target and environment in battle. 
Major innovations, the focus of Rosen's studies, 
involve changes in the concept of operation of a combat arm, 
that is, it forces one of the primary combat arms of a 
service to change its concepts of operation and its relation 
,-Ibid. I 7. 
"'Ibid. 
"'Rosen's use of the term "major innovation" differs from Davis' study 
explained above. Whereas Davis examined new technologies that were used to 
perform existing missions better, and not to change them radically, Rosen 
deliberately sought what he considers a major innovation, something that did 
alter the combat arm of a service radically. 
Rosen, Winnina, 7. 
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to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade 
traditional missions. "71 A major innovation forces an armed 
service to change "the ideas governing the way it uses its 
forces to win a campaign. "72 A major innovation, by Rosen's 
definition often involves the downgrading or abandoning of 
older concepts of operation and possibly a formerly dominant 
weapon. 
Rosen concluded that changes in doctrine can, but may 
not necessarily, represent a major innovation. His litmus 
test for innovative doctrine is whether it leaves the 
essential workings of an organization unaltered. If so, it 
does not satisfy his definition of a major innovation. For 
doctrine to be considered innovative, 
revolutionary, not just evolutionary, 
it must contain 
concepts . 7 ' 
1. Model for Successful Peacetime Military Innovation 
Inter- or postwar periods historically have been 
periods that have had tremendous impact on the military. 74 
Usually the impact has been perceived as detrimental to the 
military as a whole, and the Navy in particular. But that 
is not always the case. Changes do indeed occur, both the 
result evolution and innovation. This study, in seeking to 
draw conclusions about current innovations, will present two 
of the three innovation types found in Rosen's Winning the 
Next War--peacetime behavioral and technological 
innovations. 
'Rosen, "New Ways of War, " 134. 
'Ibid. I 8 0 
·The description of recent periods of peace as "inter- or postwar" can 
be found in ,James L. George, The U.S. Navv in the 1990s: Alternatives for 
Action (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 1. 
25 
Although change is driven by both evolutionary and 
innovative processes, Rosen found that peacetime innovations 
played a significant role in shaping today's U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps. Success ln peacetime innovations is not the 
unique province of the Navy and Marine Corps; he observed 
that successful peacetime innovations occurred with 
remarkable similarity irrespective of service. Rather than 
being imposed from civilians outside the military as argued 
by Posen,-c Rosen observed that the key to successful 
peacetime innovation was "new ideas [developed by officers 
within the military] about the ways wars would be fought in 
the future and how they might be won." 76 
In laying out his peacetime model, Rosen begins by 
myth-bashing. For example, conventional wisdom might lead 
one to believe that failure or defeat in wartime is 
necessary for peacetime innovation. 7 ~ One might think that 
this would be especially true during periods immediately 
following wars. Defeat in wartime can certainly be a 
motivator in causing change, but defeat "does not tell an 
organization what future wars will look like, only that its 
preparations for the war just ended were inadequate." 78 
History is replete with examples of defeated armies and 
navies who went on being defeated because they failed to 
7 ~In the conclusion to his book, The Sources of Militarv Doctrine: 
Fl-etnce, Britain, etnd Germanv Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Universit:,' P1·ess, 1984), (224), Barry Posen writes, "innovation should occu1.· 
m,'linly . . . when ci vi lietns v.ri th legitimate authority intervene to promote 
innovation." 
Rosen, Winnina, 57. 
This is .:t conclusion made by Posen in Sources of Militarv Doctrine 
( 224) . 
'''Rosen, Winnina, 9-10. 
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innovate. 70 Rosen concluded that failure in wartime lS not 
a requisite for peacetime innovation. 
Posen, 8° Kurt Lang81 and others have argued that because 
of their peculiar organization and culture, militaries are 
"unlikely to innovate at all if left to themselves: military 
innovation must be the result of civilian intervention." 
Rosen concluded that civilian intervention may be a factor 
in successful innovation, but it does not explain all 
innovation. For example, Rosen reported that by 1967 
President Johnson knew that he was not content with the way 
the military was fighting in Vietnam, but he could not give 
unambiguous orders to the military because he did not know 
exactly what he wanted. Johnson did not want the military 
to suggest using the atom bomb, or to send more men because 
he could think of those solutions on his own. He wanted the 
Joint Chiefs to "'search for imaginative ideas to bring this 
[Vietnam] war to a conclusion. ' "82 
7
''Two examples cited by Rosen in Winning (9), include the czarist army 
.:tfter the Russo-Japanese War and the U.S. Army's failure to "rush to develop 
innovative capabilities for counterinsurgency after the Vietnam War." See 
.:tlso, John Bushnell, "The Tsarist .1'\rmy after the Russo-Japanese War: The View 
from the Field," in Charles R. Shrader, ed., Proceedinas of the 1982 
International Militarv Historv Svmposium: The Impact of Unsuccessful Militarv 
~·.:cmJ)aicrn>C-~ on Militar·.; Institutions 1360-1980 (Carlisle Barracks, P.l'\: U.S. Army 
'::ctr Colleae, 1932), 77-99, and ,John P. Lovell, "Vietnam and the U.S. Army: 
Learning to Cope with Failure," in George Osborn, ed., Democracy, Strategy . 
.:end Vietnam (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 121-54. 
o''Barry Posen studied the British Royal Air Force, the French army, and 
the German army during the period between the two World Wars. He concluded 
th.:tt "we see little internally generated innovation in the three cases." 
Specifically, Posen argues, the French Army failed to innovate; the German 
army's changes did not represent true innovation; and the Royal Air Force 
innovated only after civilian leaders administered an external shock. (Posen, 
pp 224, 226 cited in Rosen, Winnina, pp 9-10] 
'Kurt Lang, "Military Organizations," in James G. March, ed., Handbook 
of Oraanizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) 
'-Minutes of 12 September 1967 weekly luncheon with Secretaries Dean 
Rusk .:tnd Robert McNamera, Walter Rostow, George Christian, Harold Johnson, Jim 
,Jones, notetake1·, Declassified Documents Registry Service, 1987, #1798, quoted 
in Rosen, Winnina, 10. 
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Rosen cited Richard Neustadt's 
five conditions that must prevail if a president's 
order is to be readily obeyed by his bureaucratic 
subordinates. The president himself must be 
clearly involved in the decision, and his order 
must be unambiguous. His order must be widely 
publicized, and 'the men who receive it [must 
have] control over everything needed to carry it 
out,' and they must have no doubt of his 
'authority to issue' the order. 85 
The difficulty civilians encounter in getting the military 
to innovate is compounded by the ambiguity of such an order. 
Military men are accustomed to well-defined tasks, and may 
lack the "unconventional creativity" to carry out such an 
order. Also, some in the professional military may believe 
that ordering the military how to fight may be outside the 
bounds of the legitimate authority of the civilian 
leadership. ~ 4 
Next, Rosen tackled the myth of "military mavericks" 
changing their services. Rosen seems to sidestep the issue 
by careful selection of criteria for mavericks. He uses the 
term in its dictionary sense2: to exclude the individuals 
most often cited by others as mavericks, for example, Billy 
Mitchell, B. H. Liddell Hart, Charles de Gaulle, and Hyman 
Rickover. 
Rosen concedes that Billy Mitchell was a maverick, but 
denigrates his impact on air development. He cites Henry 
"Hap" Arnold's claim that Mitchell created resistance within 
the War Department, and caused others to take a more narrow 
view of aviation as an offensive power in warfare. 8 G 
''Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1980), 16, 
quoted in Rosen, Winning, 11. 
"~Rosen, Hinnina, pp 10-11. 
''Webster's defines a mave1:ick as "an independently minded person who 
refuses to abide by the dictates of or 1·esists adherence to a particular 
group." [Webster's, 704.] 
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Similarly, he acknowledges that both Liddell Hart and 
de Gaulle were advocates of innovation in ground warfare. 
By taking their cases outside military channels to the 
civilian chiefs of their war departments, Rosen concludes, 
"as with Mitchell, the judgment of history is that by doing 
so they probably reduced the willingness of the professional 
military to consider innovation." 87 
In the case of Hyman Rickover and the nuclear navy, 
Rosen concludes that the image of "'Rickover against the 
navy' . was a myth deliberately created by Rickover. "88 
While it may have been advantageous for Rickover's program 
to have the level of Congressional support that it received, 
Rosen concludes 
nuclear propulsion was obviously in the interest 
of the Navy, particularly the submarine force, and 
senior navy officers supported it before Rickover 
emerged as its most visable advocate, and they 
supported Rickover despite, and not because of, 
his aggressive self-promotion and cultivation of 
an independent role. sg 
a. Sources of Peacetime Military Innovation 
In his quest for explanations of military 
innovation during peacetime, Rosen found that innovation is 
often rooted in the services themselves. The military 
services are not monolithic structures, nor are they 
composed of subunits simply pursuing their own 
organizational self-interests. U.S. Army officers 
""Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Hutchison, 1951), 97, cited in 
Rosen, Winnina, 12. 
'"Rosen, h'inning, 13. 
-'Ibid., 1,.., 
"·Rosen c:i tes several sources for Rickover material. The myth in action 
is best described in the statements of Senator Henry Jackson cited in Michael 
Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 65-66, cited in Rosen, Winning, 
12. 
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may come from the infantry, artillery, armor, 
aviation, airborne, or special forces. Navy 
officers may be carrier pilots from the fighter or 
attack communities, antisubmarine warfare pilots, 
submariners, surface ship commanders, or from an 
amphibious force. Each branch has its own culture 
and distinct way of thinking about the way war 
should be conducted, not only by its own branch, 
but by other branches and services with which it 
would have to interact in cornbat. 90 
Despite these divisions or professional factions, 
there is nevertheless general agreement among the various 
branches about how they should work together in wartime, and 
this is a sign of a healthy organization. Rosen also argues 
that the balance between the services is not static. 
Rather, he contends that there will be vigorous debate 
particularly over the relative priority of roles and 
missions, especially in times of constrained resources. 
Since victory in war ultimately legitimates military 
organizations, there will also be arguments over what the 
next war will or should look like. It is here that Rosen 
says the seeds of innovation are sown: in 
struggle around a new theory of victory. 
the ideological 
The new theory of 
victory must contain an explanation of what the next war 
will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be 
·\' 
won. 
Rosen's studies of successful and failed 
innovations led him to conclude that shifts in ideology or 
strategy by themselves are insufficient for the innovation 
to succeed. 
The new theory must be translated into concrete, 
new tasks that are performed every day, in peace 
and in war, . without the development of new 




abstract and may not affect the way the 
organization actually behaves. 92 
What is more important, Rosen concluded that officers who 
are successful at performing tasks related to the new theory 
of victory must be given opportunities to compete 1n a 
career path that provides them a reasonable chance for 
success. 
One important source of power 1n the military is 
control over the promotion of officers. The intellectual 
struggle over theories of victory is not immune from such 
power considerations. In fact, supporters of the new theory 
must wage a "hard-headed, concerted effort to gain control 
over whatever mechanisms determine who becomes an admiral or 
general."q' There are several reasons for this. First, if 
a career in the new field leads to a dead end, only the slow 
and the uninformed will fill the ranks. Second, 
the creation of a new promotion pathway to the 
senior ranks, [is necessary] so that young 
officers learning and practicing the new way of 
war can rise to the top, as part of a generational 
change. Q 4 
The new pathway ensures that the new skills are not 
relegated to professional oblivion. For example, if the new 
skill is viewed merely as a technical specialty, then 
officers possessing that skill will not be seen as having 
the broad background that qualifies them for flag rank. 
After discussing promotion pathways, Rosen 
returned the subject of mavericks. He argued that mavericks 
by definition lack the necessary political power within the 
service to create pathways for promotion or to protect 
'cibid., 20. 
'Ibid. 
"'Ibid. I 20-21. 
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junior officers. Simply put, change must come about 
"through the actions of those who have power. "95 
Rosen concludes that civilians can play a role in 
the protection of junior officers and/or advocates, but that 
role is limited because civilians, acting alone, possess 
little "legitimate" political power in the promotion of 
officers. Civilians by themselves cannot legitimize their 
military proteges; they can help protect military 
innovators, but the innovators must establish legitimacy 
within the officer corps itself. 
In short, 
Peacetime military innovation occurs when 
respected senior military officers formulate a 
strategy for innovation, which has both 
intellectual and organizational components. 
Civilian intervention is effective to the extent 
that it can support or protect these efforts.q0 
2. Model for Successful Technological Military 
Innovation 
Rosen categorized both peacetime and wartime innovation 
as "social innovation," that is, concerned with changing the 
way men and women in organizations behave. Technological 
innovation is concerned with machinery--the hardware of 
war. The two types of innovation are integrated 
differently. Just as he bashed myths in laying out his 
peacetime model, Rosen raised and refuted rival hypotheses 
as he substantiated his model for technological innovation. 
First he addresses the idea that intelligence about 
enemy capabilities drives technological innovation. He 
·srbid., 21. 
'"Ibid. , 21. 
,-Ibid., 40. 
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concludes, "the overall picture of American military 
research and development . . is one of technological 
innovation largely unaffected by the activities of potential 
enemies, a rather self-contained process in which actions 
and actors within the military establishment were the main 
determinants of innovation. "98 
Although primarily concerned with machinery, technology 
interjects a new set of actors--scientists--into the 
environment in which military decisions are made. 99 Rosen 
and Davis both found that most of the Navy's greatest 
technological innovations were invented by civilian 
scientists outside the Navy. Whether it is because of 
potential large contracts, or another reason, civilian 
scientists and inventors frequently knock on the doors of 
the Navy. Despite the "push" from the scientific community, 
technological innovation also generally required the vision 
of active duty officers to express how the new technology 
could benefit the service and contribute to winning the next 
war. 
Rosen found a vast literature concerning technological 
innovation in the business world, and much less that applied 
directly to the military. Studies of technological 
innovation in the military are divided into many areas. 
Some like Kurth, examined the bureaucratic politics of 
technological innovation. Others have tried to determine 
the appropriate rate of technological innovation. Some have 
attempted to determine whether demand (need) pulled 
innovation, or whether scientific progress created a 
technology push. 100 Rosen reported that the literature is 




'See Rosen, Winnina, 39-53, for an array of sources. 
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push" positions since there is evidence supporting both 
hypotheses and they are not mutually exclusive, i.e., 
sometimes it may happen one way and sometimes the other. 
Some writers have tried to examine whether intelligence 
about enemy capabilities played a role in technological 
innovation. Other analysts have tried to perform some cost-
benefit analysis about technology. On the matter of enemy 
intelligence driving technological innovations, Rosen found 
no clear pattern. 
Technological innovation was not closely linked 
with either intelligence about the enemy, though 
such intelligence has been extremely useful when 
available, or with reliable projections of the 
cost and utility of alternative technologies. 
Rather, the problems of choosing new technologies 
seem to have been best handled when treated as a 




III. THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION (MTR) 
Then in the short space of twenty years sails gave 
place to steam, wood to metal, oak to armor, and 
smooth bores to rifled cannon. 
S. S. Robison 
Military analysts believe there have been 
four military technical revolutions; development 
of the internal combustion engine; use of the 
blitzkrieg by the Nazis as an operational art; 
development of atomic weapons; and current 
generation military affairs. These are periods 
marked by such distinct technical advances and 
operational innovations that the very nature of 
warfare changed. 2 
The concept of a military-technological revolution may 
be relatively new, but as the previous paragraph indicates 
the present revolution is not the first. This chapter 
introduces the concept of today's Military-Technological 
Revolution (MTR) and briefly describes its introduction into 
U.S. thinking and debates. Additionally, this chapter 
addresses current trends in the MTR as they are relevant to 
the U.S. Navy. 
A. HISTORY OF THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION (MTR) 
Andrew Krepinevich formerly of the Office of Secretary 
of Defense (Net Assessment) traces the idea of a "military-
technical revolution" from Russian military writings of the 
1980s. "., Beginning in the early 1980s, top Soviet officers, 
including Marshal Nikoli Ogarkov, worried that a revolution 
'The literature contains references to both a Militarv-Technical 
Revolution and a Military-Technological Revolution. The author has found no 
distinction between the two. The terms appear to be used interchangeably. 
·•u.s. Group to Assess Military 'Revolution,'" Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 
April 1994, WESTLAW, 2674440. 
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Militarv-Technical Revolution: A 
Preliminarv Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Office of Secretary of Defense (Net 
Assessment), July 1992), p. 3, quoted in Hayes, et al., 1. 
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ln the linking of technology and weapons would leave their 
country behind. 4 
Although the Russians may have been the first to 
recognize, and write about the current revolution, there are 
references to the "military-technical revolution, " and 
"revolution ln military affairs" in Soviet writings from the 
early 1960s as well. 5 In the introduction to Military-
Technical Revolution John Erickson describes how "the 
substance of a once-familiar stability has been consumed 
with fiery abruptness by the onset and the cumulative 
technical triumphs of the 'military revolution' that centers 
around nuclear weaponry. "'' Essays in the book describe how 
weapons of mass destruction, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, anti-ballistic missile defense systems, guided 
weapons and the concept of limited war constitute the 
revolution. 
There is even an essay entitled, "The Future of Manned 
Aircraft," in which its author describes the conditions 
necessary to eliminate manned aircraft as effective weapon 
systems. The arguments raised are virtually the same 
arguments being raised today. Manned combat aircraft 
continued to play a huge role in the world's armed forces 
following the last MTR; the question is will they still play 
as large a role following the next MTR? 
4
"War Convinced Soviets They Were Right About Battle Philosophy," 
Aerospace Dailv, 16 October 1991, WESTLAW, 2539944. 
5For example, the book entitled, The Militarv-Technical Revolution: Its 
Impact on Strateav and Foreian Policv, was published for the Institute for the 
Study of the USSR, in Munich, Germany in 1966. The book was the outcome of a 
symposium held at the institute in Munich in October 1964, a few days after 
the fctll of Nikita Khrushchev and the explosion of an atomic device by the 
Chinese Peoples Republic. 
··John Erickson, ed., The Militarv-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on 
Strateav and Foreian Policv (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 1. 
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B. THE CURRENT MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION 
In the late 1980s, the term military-technological 
revolution (MTR) began to appear in in the open press. The 
MTR was describing the Soviets' perception that future wars 
would be radically different from those of the past. By 
February of 1990, the Pentagon's five-year defense planning 
guidance (DPG) "directed the services to conduct 
'aggressive' research and development, including programs of 
'limited production' and experimentation . . in equipment 
and operational concepts.' "7 The DPG's directions came at a 
time when it was assumed that the defense budget would be 
cut substantially, and yet the Pentagon's planning guidance 
called for R&D to be speeded up to exploit what the Soviets 
were calling the MTR. Many believed that the MTR meant 
"more bang for the Buck." As early as 1989, some liberals 
were citing the MTR as reason for halving the defense 
budget. 8 
Analysis of the 1991 Gulf War seemed to confirm what 
the Soviets were writing and saying--the military-
technological revolution has begun. 
Frank Kendall, deputy director of tactical warfare 
programs in the Defense Research and Engineering 
office, said the Soviets "have taken the results 
of the [Persian Gulf] war and looked at them 
against their concept of the military-
technological revolution and concluded that" there 
is a near match. 0 
7
"Five-Year Defense Guidance Assumes CFE, Calls for Aggressive R&D," 
Aerospace Daily, 8 Feb 1990, WESTLAW, 2210921. 
"Former Pentagon advisor, William H. Kaufman, of Harvard University, 
proposed cutting the defense budget from $305 billion to $160 billion by 1999. 
Se~ "Ex-Defense Advisor Calls for Budget 'Revolution,'" San Francisco 
Chronicle, 22 November 1989, WESTLAW. 
''"War Convinced Soviets They Were Right About Battle Philosophy," 
Aerospace Daily, 16 October 1991, WESTLAW, 2539944. 
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In the Gulf War, there was far less reliance on direct fire 
then in the past. The U.S. was able to "see the battlefield 
in depth and breadth, quickly communicate target data, and 
strike with weapons that had a high probability of kill."
10 
Although Desert Shield and Desert Storm signalled to 
the world that the nature of warfare was changing, the 
picture of future combat is still hazy; the changes are far 
from complete. 
One battle continuing is the role of air power. 
Following the Gulf War, some were quick to conclude that 
there is a "new era of warfare that air power will 
dominate." 11 Exhaustive studies of the Gulf War are being 
completed to see what the results can teach about future 
conflicts. Eliot A. Cohen, a strategic studies professor at 
Johns Hopkins University directed the Gulf War air survey. 
He said that "the study's results do not yet support the 
contention of some Pentagon theorists that new capabilities 
in target detection, information processing and radar-
evading stealth have ushered in a 'military technological 
revolution' in which air power will dominate future 
battlefields." 12 As Rosen tells us, debate over future war 
is healthy, and can lead to major innovations. 
1. Future Trends in the MTR 
In 1992, the Pentagon proposed a Defense Science and 
Technology Strategy that identified seven areas of 
technological development as being crucial to maintaining 
America's edge in military technology. The seven areas 
referred to as science and technology "thrusts" are: 
11
"Gulf War-Study Points Out Limits of Air Power," Periscope Daily 
Defense News Capsules, 13 May 1993, WESTLAW 29033640. 
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-global surveillance and communications; 
-precision strike weapons; 
-air superiority and air defense systems; 
-sea control and undersea systems; 
-advanced land warfare systems; 
-'synthetic environments' (advanced simulation 
of future battlefields [so-called virtual 
reality] for preparation and 
training) ; and 
-cost reduction technologies. 13 
Research and development are continuing. Despite the 
transition to the term revolution in military affairs to 
describe future combat, Defense Secretary William Perry 
continues his push for the MTR today. Of the seven thrusts 
mentioned above all affect Navy Department roles and 
missions. In an updated list of priorities, the Pentagon 
recently identified the following specific priority areas 
for future study; stealth technology, precision weapons, and 
computers and information processing. 14 
2. The Military-Technical Revolution in the U.S. Navy 
In 1994, the Naval War College Review published U.S. 
Naval Reserve Captain John Bodnar's article in which he 
identifies areas of applicability within the MTR for the 
U.S. Navy. Bodn.:::>.r makes the case that the MTR can be 
divided into three distinct phases: 
- a military engineering revolution, 
- a military sensor revolution, and 
- a military communications revolution. 15 
''Baker Spring and John Luddy, "Keeping America Safe and Strong: A New 
U.S. Defense Policy," in A Safe and Prosperous America: A U.S. Foreign and 
Defense Policv Blueprint, ed. Kim R. Holmes (Washington, DC: The Heritage 
Foundation, 1994), p 68. 
;,"Deutch Gets 'Report Card' Letter on the Revolution in Military 
Affairs, " Inside The Navv, 24 Oct 1994, 11. 
; ''Bodnar , 7 . 
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Bodnar states that the military engineering revolution, 
while perhaps not complete, has reached some tangible, 
practical limits. For example, ICBM'S exist that can reach 
all corners of the globe, as can manned aircraft. 
Therefore, he concludes the practical limit on range has 
been reached. Turning next to limits on speed, Bodnar 
examined a series of speed related issues; e.g., transport 
aircraft, combat aircraft, sea transportation, etc. He 
concludes that the world has reached the practical limit on 
speed as well. 16 His argument that practical limits have 
been reached is based on his conclusion that "engineering 
technologies have pushed materials and human bodies so near 
their physical limits that new generations of weapons and 
platforms will be grossly more expensive for marginal 
gain. 1'" 
Bodnar claims that speed limits are becoming apparent 
ln a third field too. Communication also has two practical 
speed limits--the speed of light in transmission of data, 
and the speed of thought in the limit of the human brain to 
absorb information and act on it. 
Despite this speed limit, Bodnar postulates that the 
potential for exploiting the new revolution in military 
1
"Bodnar observes that the practical limit on transport aircraft is the 
speed of sound. He considers the Concorde and other supersonic transports to 
be novelties that failed to revolutionize air transport. He argues that the 
cruise missile maximum speed has been capped also at the speed of sound 
because of the high fuel usage above that speed. He concludes that fighter 
aircraft dogfight maneuvering limits are approximately 2 g's--the limit of the 
man in the airframe. Bodnar reports that the ballistic missile speed limit is 
18,000 mph because at higher speeds it will orbit the earth. Because of drag 
and fuel considerations, he concludes that the sea transport speed limit is 
approximately 30 knots and the most efficient speed for oil/coal burning 
vessels is between fifteen and twenty knots. He finds the land transport 
maximum speed is 55 mph. For an explanation of how he reached his conclusions, 
see Bodnar, 10-13. 
;~Bodnar, 14. 
40 
technology resides in the ability to collect, process, and 
disseminate information. 
The real revolution of this phase of the MTR in 
the U.S. military was in the better combat 
efficiency that arose from the ability of 
individual platforms to collect, collate, and 
react to huge quantities of sensor data quickly 
and effectively, and rapidly launch highly 
sophisticated and programmable ('smart') 
weapons . 18 
As the analysis of the Gulf War progresses, lessons are 
being learned and new aspects of modern warfare are 
emerging. Many are technology based, e.g., improved 
communications and information warfare, pilotless vehicles 
(both air and ground), and smart weapons. Other aspects of 
the revolution such as, the Navy's new littoral focus are 
less reliant on technology, but are revolutionary 
nonetheless. To encompass all of the revolutionary changes 
taking place (not only the technological changes) the term 




IV. THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA} 
"Desert Storm represents a revolution in warfare." 1 
The words are those of U.S. Air Force General George Horner 
speaking at the 1994 symposium on New-Era Warfare. The 
torrent of articles with the same theme suggest that a 
consensus is forming among military analysts. Why? What 
was truly revolutionary about Desert Storm? One reason 
General Horner said was President Bush's priority to 
minimize casualties; not only for coalition forces and 
civilians, but for Iraqi troops as well. Describing the 
Gulf War, Soviet analysts reported, "the nature of modern 
war has changed radically from what seemed commonplace only 
) a few years ago. " 2 They observed increased importance of 
fire power over maneuver, and marveled at the "associated 
impact of new technologies in changing the face of battle."' 
But there is more than just new technologies. 
Major General Vladimir Slipchenko, a Russian military 
scientist from the General Staff Academy, drawing on lessons 
from the Gulf War, offered his vision of future war. He 
began by noting that when advanced-technology 
weapons are expanded on a large enough scale, as 
they were in the Gulf, "these weapons will create 
a new revolution in military affairs. Large 
groups of military units may not be needed in the 
future." General Slipchenko added that there 
would be "no front lines or flanks" in future wars 
and that enemy territory would instead be divided 
"into targets and nontargets." War will involve 
the massive use of technology and will be over 
quickly, the political structure will destroy 
1George Horner, "New-Era Warfare," Washington Roundtable on Science & 
Public Policv, by the George C. Marshall Institute (Washington, DC: George C. 
Marshall Institute, 1994). 
-Benjamin S. Lambeth, Desert Storm and Its Meanina: The View from 
[v[oscov!, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1992), 69. 
'Ibid. 
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itself, and there will be no need to occupy enemy 
terri tory. 4 
The concept of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) 
lS relatively new in the United States. It is replacing the 
concept of the military-technological revolution (MTR) 
because the RMA is more inclusive. This chapter introduces 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and summarizes 
current trends in the RMA as they are relevant to the U.S. 
Navy. 
A. WHY A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS INSTEAD OF A 
MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION? 
Technology is a catalyst to innovation. The 
availability of new technology enables military planners and 
dreamers to visualize future warfare using the new hardware 
and software. But technology alone does not constitute a 
revolution, and indeed may not be necessary for one to take 
place. Once again, Soviet writings about revolutions in 
technology and military affairs reflect a longer history on 
the subject. In an October 1961 speech to the Twenty-Second 
Party Congress, Nikita Khrushchev explained that "successes 
in socialist production and in Soviet science and 
engineering have allowed us to bring about the present 
revolution in military affairs."s The technology is an 
enabler in bringing about a revolution in military affairs. 
In 1994, America's military leaders concluded that 
technology alone would not cause a military revolution, and 
a plethora of articles began appearing about the revolution 
4 Ibid., 70. 
·'Nikolai Galay, "The Soviet Approach to the Modern Military Revolution," 
in Th>? Mili tanr-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strateav and Foreign 
Policv (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) John Erickson .. ed., quoting from 
by I<:rasnava zvezda (Red Star), April 4, 1962. 
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in military affairs. Admiral Paul David Miller, Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, wrote 
But the technological multiplier effect, by 
itself, cannot offset the planned force reductions 
forecast in the Department of Defense's Bottom-Up 
Review.(, We need to break with the past and 
actively explore new ways to provide our joint 
force commanders with enabling capabilities. 7 
The focus of the RMA is primarily on doctrine, but an 
important component is technology. The "MTR will develop 
innovative systems to make doctrinal changes work. Just as 
the tank was essential to the blitzkrieg, technology will 
play an enabling role in the RMA. "8 Many analysts believe 
that much enabling technology is available today. 
However emphasis for the future must be ideas, 
concepts, and doctrine. "The MTR denotes too great an 
emphasis on technology. Therefore, much of the interested 
community now uses the term Revolution in Military Affairs, 
which focuses on revolution, and clearly places technology 
in a supporting role. "g U.S. Navy Captain Bradd Hayes who 
edited the 1994 Naval War College Report, The Politics of 
Naval Innovation, writes "technical innovation without 
doctrinal innovation cannot spark an RMA. "10 
"In fact force levels are being cut below the Bottom-Up Review levels. 
7 Paul D. Miller, "The Military After Next: Shaping U.S. Forces for the 
Next Century," The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 120 (February 1994): 42. 
""Pentagon Looks at Technology Revolution," Defense & Aerospace 
Elo?ctronics, 11 Nov 1994, WESTLAW, 2707243. 
oJeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994, 40. 
1
"Hayes and Smith, 5. 
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B. THE CURRENT REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
In the U.S., one of the first open source references to 
the "revolution in military affairs" is in Michael 
MccGuire's 1987 book, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign 
Policy. In Military Objectives, MccGuire describes the 
Soviets' "new political thinking" based upon changes in the 
world including increased interdependence among nations 
causing national security to depend more on mutual security. 
MccGuire, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 
reported that Soviet doctrine no longer considered 
escalation of conflict with the West inevitable. He wrote 
that another concrete factor pushing the Soviets toward 'new 
thinking' about foreign and defense policy is the impending 
revolution in milita~ affairs being generated by new 
technologies. The Soviets feared a new arms race, so by 
admitting the interactive nature of the arms race, they 
hoped to dampen its effect . 11 
The first public mention of the RMA by the White House 
was in Vice President Dan Quayle's speech to the 1989 
graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 
NY. Quayle told the graduating cadets that a revolution in 
military affairs will require "new military organizations 
and new methods of warfare." The vice president said that 
he expects a revolution in military affairs over the next 10 
to 15 years that will "require us to develop new operational 
concepts, new military organizations and new methods of 
warfare. " 12 Quayle challenged the graduates to be ready to 
fight in battles far different from the historical battles 
that they studied. 
: 
1Michael MccGuire, "Military Logic Changes Foreign Policy, " Newsday 14 
June 1987, 4, WESTLAW. 
::Danforth Quayle quoted in "Quayle at West Point, Talks of Revolution 
in Ivlilita~-y Affairs," Boston Globe, 25 Ivlay 1989, 8, WESTLAW, AA0709;05/24. 
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In November 1989, William H. Kaufman, of the Brookings 
Institution, and former advisor to Secretaries of Defense, 
Robert McNamara and Harold Brown, unveiled his plan to trim 
the U.S. defense budget by $145 billion over ten years, 
saying the U.S. should take such action as a result of the 
revolution in military affairs. 13 
C. WHAT DOES THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS FORETELL? 
First of all, focusing on the RMA allows U.S. military 
planners to be proactive. This is an historic opportunity 
for strategic planners--"It is easier to design a future 
than it is to predict it." 14 For the United States, the RMA 
means "information dominance" over opponents. The U.S. 
plans to have complete information over a 40,000 square mile 
(200mi. X 200mi.) battle-space. 15 
Analysts are projecting competing views of what the RMA 
will bring. If the RMA occurs, it will certainly affect 
contractors as well as the military. One analyst predicts 
an "increase in efficiency arising from the appearance of 
tens of thousands of smaller firms, compared to the Fortune 
500, " 1'· and the military will benefit tremendously from this 
increased efficiency and competition. 
Martin van Creveld writes, 
This [future combat, post RMA] does not mean that 
technology has no role to play in the military 
future. What it does mean is a move away from 
todayls large expensive, powerful machines toward 
small, cheap gadgets capable of being manufactured 
1 
'"Ex-Defense Advisor Calls for Budget 1 Revolution, 1 " San Francisco 
Chronicle, 22 November 1989, All, WESTLAW. 
1;Paul Bracken in Paul Bracken and Raoul Henri Alcala, Whither the RMA: 
Two Perspectives on Tomorrov:'s Armv (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 




in large numbers and used almost anywhere, much 
as, in the past, firearms replaced the knight and 
his cumbersome armor. " 17 
Other analysts argue that the RMA is doctrine oriented. 18 
John Deutch, Deputy Defense Secretary, referred to the RMA 
as follows, 
As an operative concept describing changes in 
modern warfare, RMA reduces the emphasis on 
technology and adds a greater weight to the impact 
of changes in operational concepts and 
organizations. The three main components are 
information warfare, precision strike, and 
dominant maneuver. 1g 
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
RMA has become the lexicon for discussing future war. Five 
task forces were formed near the end of 1993 at Defense 
Secretary William Perry's request to study various aspects 
of the RMA. Late in the fall of 1994, the five task forces 
were organized into three groups. 20 
The three groups include the task force on 
"Fostering/Institutionalizing Long Term Innovation," headed 
by Andrew Marshall, the director of the Pentagon's Office of 
Net Assessment. Marshall's group which has completed its 
:'Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free 
Press, 1991), 210. 
1bRaoul Henri Alcala in Paul Bracken and Raoul Henri Alcala , Whither 
th.=. RM.Z\.: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Armv (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 
War College, 1994), 16. 
'""Deutch Gets 'Report Card' Letter on the Revolution in Military 
.Z\.ffairs," Inside the Navv. 24 October 1994, 11. 
"Initially the five task forces were to report to Secretary Perry in 
September 1994. As that deadline approached, the groups were reorganized, 
directed to focus on gaming and modeling to create a vision of future combat, 
cmd future combat requirements. The revised reporting deadline is March 1995. 
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evaluation, and is expected to brief the RMA steering 
committee early. 21 
The second task force is the theater warfare task 
force. Their task was to conduct a series of intensive 
wargames to identify future needs of the military. Their 
report will address "Combined Arms and Maneuver (co-chaired 
by Army and Marine Corps officials), Deep Strike (co-chaired 
by Navy and Air Force officials), and Naval Forward 
Operations (co-chaired by Marine Corps and Navy 
officials) . "22 
The third task force, chaired by OSD officials, covers 
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). It will brief last, and is 
expected to cover 14 tasks critical to successful low 
intensity operations. 2:; 
At the same time the Pentagon announced the timeframe 
for the task force reports and briefings, the relationship 
between the MTR and RMA. 
MTR was used before the RMA effort to describe 
massive changes in conducting warfare resulting 
from advances in technology. . RMA is considered 
the 'logical outgrowth' of MTR. It refocuses on 
innovations in operational concepts, doctrine, and 
organization that are employing new technologies 
and opportunities. The RMA recognizes dominant 
maneuver as a key component of warfare and de-
emphasizes the impact of technology as the driver 
in the revolutionary changes in the way wars are 
fought. "4 
The Pentagon has made RMA a top priority. The Navy is 
a player. What role will the Navy play? Chapter five will 
address that question. Navy personnel are assigned to the 
:
1
"Deutch Gets 'Report Card' Letter on the Revolution in Military 
.Z:,ffairs," Inside the Navv. 24 October 1994, 11. 
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Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, the lead office for the 
task force on Fostering/Institutionalizing Long Term 
Innovation. As part of their work on the task force, U.S. 
Navy Commanders James R. Fitzsimonds and Commander Jan M. 
van Tol, from the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, wrote an article for the Spring 
1994 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly about "Revolutions in 
Military Affairs" ~s in which they identify three pre-
conditions to the full realization of an RMA. The three 
conditions are: 
- Technological Development, 
- Doctrinal (or Operational) Innovation, and 
- Organizational Adaptation. 
It is the Pentagon's view that the technology is 
available, and doctrine development is underway in all 
services and at the joint level. The third condition will 
likely prove the most difficult. Organizational adaptation 
means bureaucratic acceptance and significant change. 
According to Fitzsimonds and van Tol, "it is the synergistic 
effect of these three preconditions that leads to an RMA. "26 
1. Perspectives on RMA prospects 
There are few optimists forecasing either a quick or easy 
time implementing an RMA. One analyst writing about the RMA 
concluded, 
The formal Defense Department Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and the 
day-to-day practices that give it life, have two 
characteristics that inhibit a true revolution in 
military affairs. The first is the lack of an 
institutional, procedural link to joint doctrine. 
-~James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tal, "Revolutions in Military 




The second is the prevalence of threat-oriented 
marginal analysis. 27 
Retired U.S. Army Colonel Raoul Alcala, writing for the U.S. 
Army War College, sees "more evolution than revolution in 
evidence. " 28 Alcala is very pessimistic about an RMA 
anytime soon. In April 1994, 29 he wrote, "revolution in 
doctrine will be possible only to the extent that 
significantly different futures concepts or their equivalent 
drive the process. There are no such revolutionary 
concepts, service-unique or joint, in existence or under 
development. " 30 
In describing the Russian military--but equally true of 
U.S. armed forces in the current context--Benjamin S. 
Lambeth observed that "the military is now adjusting itself 
from a threat-specific to a more mission-specific planning 
environment, in which external challenges have become 
indeterminate and unavailing of easy standards for deciding 
on force size and composition. " 31 
Remembering Rosen's conclusion that failures 1n 
innovation were the result of failure to innovate rather 
than in choosing inappropriate innovations, it is clear that 
the U.S. military needs to keep innovating. 
"
7 Raoul Alcala in Paul Bracken and Raoul Henri Alcala, Whither the RMA: 
Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Armv (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, 1994) , 39. 
~Oibid. f 40 • 
"Alcala wrote this prior to the reorganization of the five RM.Z\. task 
forces, and the emphasis placed on wargaming. 
1
"Alcala, 41 
31Benjamin S. Lambeth, Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from 




A. LESSONS FROM THE MODELS 
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this 
study is to apply lessons and conclusions from models of 
military innovation to the changes taking place in the Navy 
today. 
1. General Observations 
The three models presented in Chapter Two present three 
different views of how military innovation occurs. First, 
Davis showed that innovation usually begins with a mid-grade 
officer who finds a better way of doing something. He 
enlists the support of peers first, and later he convinces 
more senior officers to support his project. Usually a 
counter-alliance emerges. When it does, it usually forms in 
the more senior ranks. Davis concluded that at this point 
the successful innovation advocate must become a zealot. 
Next, Kurth reported that there are many institutional 
constraints on innovation in the Navy, but not on efficiency 
improvements. To enact a major innovation, a maverick 
zealot is necessary. The institutional constraints 
described by Kurth are severe enough that Kurth concluded 
innovation gets stifled unless the zealot develops allies 
outside the uniformed Navy. The allies are often located in 
the Congress, White House, or in the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense. 
Finally, Rosen offered multiple models for different 
conditions. In peacetime, innovation occurs because 
military men construct a vision of what the next war will be 
like, envision the pivotal role that innovation will play in 
winning, and then set in motion the steps to get things 
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done. Rosen concluded that true innovation occurs when 
senior officers in positions of power provide a new career 
path (potentially leading to flag rank) for junior officers 
to pursue. Without the incentive of a credible career path 
"blessed" by powerful senior officers, the innovation will 
not attract quality officers, and the innovation will wither 
and fade. Rosen also concluded that technological 
innovation is a special case. He said technological 
innovation occurred primarily to manage uncertainty. When 
military officers are faced with uncertain conditions, they 
look everywhere often turning outwar to find people who can 
offer solutions. 
Although not formally presented in Chapter Two because 
his model has not been validated by experience in recent 
naval innovations, Barry Posen's model of innovation imposed 
from outside the military is considered valid by some 
scholars, and is used for comparison within the literature. 
Recent experiences with revolutionary innovations such 
as the introduction of cruise missiles and the Aegis combat 
system into the Navy reveals that no single model explains 
all cases. More likely, since every innovation is unique, 
one model may work for a particular innovation, and another 
for another. Some combination of the models may provide the 
most accurate generalization, but some specific observations 
are germane. 
Kurth bridges the gap between Posen, who argues that 
outside intervention is usually required for innovation, and 
Rosen whose hypothesis holds that innovation occurs when 
those inside the military have a vision of what the next war 
will be like and what will be required to win. Kurth wrote 
"an innovative departure may be pursued in response to a 
crisis; or the innovator may postulate the crisis to which 
he offers his proposal as a response." 1 
'Kurth, 381. 
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CDR Douglas V. Smith, U.S. Navy, co-editor and coauthor 
of the 1994 Naval War College Report, The Politics of Naval 
Innovation, referred to what he called the three paradigms--
Posen, innovation imposed by outsiders; Rosen, innovation 
from the top, down; Davis, innovation from bottom, up--and 
observed that none of the three is 
singularly accurate concerning the manner in which 
revolutiona~ innovation makes its way into the 
naval establishment. Rather, the diversity of 
potential sources of such innovation appears 
firmly established. 2 
Although no single model successfully explains all 
innovation, there are still lessons that can be derived. 
Admiral Kurth proposed some specific measures to foster 
innovation. Captain Signor also summarized his lessons from 
the cruise missile case, in a useful form for those 
interested in current or future innovations. 
2. Specific Remedies From the Models 
Describing Admiral Rickover's frustration with the 
system, Kurth wrote, there is a conflict between the system 
of rotating officers to broaden experiences and the depth of 
knowledge and sustained effort that innovation demands, 
particularly at the early stages. His solution--remove the 
conditions contributing to inertia, and the burden such a 
system causes to "Navy technological development work" 3 by 
increasing the emphasis on technical graduate education for 
naval officers, increasing specialization, and lengthening 
tours. 
=Bradd C., Hayes and Douglas V. Smith, eds., The Politics of Naval 
Innow1tion. Strategic Research Department Research Report (4-94. Newport: U.S. 
Naval War College, 1994), 75. 
'Kurth, 385. 
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Kurth seems to favor nurturing the zealot "who can 
produce results with adequate organizational support, power 
and funds. Let the leader assemble his own team and attack 
the problem. "4 Kurth argued that good men know how to find 
other good men. He favors turning the zealots loose to 
produce, as unburdened as possible. Where contractors are 
involved, the process is necessarily more burdensome due to 
regulation and oversight requirements. The Clinton 
administration has made it a priority to reduce the 
regulatory burden on government contracting; however, it is 
too early to determine the success or failure of such 
initiatives. 
Kurth and the Naval War College group observed that 
often outside leadership is necessary to protect the zealots 
from intra-service rivalries. Admiral William Owens, Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is trying to 
encourage true innovation but it is unclear if his efforts 
will extend to defending innovati.on zealots as· they emerge. 
After studying the cruise missile and Aegis combat 
system cases, Hayes and Smith, et al., concluded "the value 
of technical competence in Navy program managers cannot be 
overemphasized." As naval warfare becomes more technical, 
they argued technical competence becomes even more important 
than managerial prowess in getting innovations developed. 
Although this finding is the opposite of what might be 
expected, technical expertise is essential for dealing with 
scientists and engineers, and also for dealing with critics, 
contractors, and Congress. The conclusion of Hayes and 
Smith, et al., is consistent with Davis' opinion that the 
innovation advocate possesses specialized technical 
knowledge that enables him to visualize the innovation . 
.;Ibid., 388. 
5Hayes and Smith, 83. 
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Navy Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer,b program manager of the Aegis 
program, is an excellent example of the type of officer 
Davis, Hayes and Smith et al., described. 
The lessons provided by Captain Signor from his study 
of the cruise missile program are addressed later in this 
chapter. 
3. Utility of the Models 
All the models examined in this study contributed to a 
better understanding of the innovation process. Each model 
appears to have accurately characterized the circumstances 
that they addressed. Applying the models to predict success 
or failure is a new venture. Rather than applying a model 
rigidly, the models are more illustrative when more loosely 
applied. 
For example, Davis argued that zealots emerge from 
middle grade officers who seek to carry out their innovation 
without seeking allies outside the Navy. At the time that 
Davis' monograph was written and published, the United 
States had not yet digested the lessons of the Vietnam War; 
Congressional oversight and interference with military 
weapon systems was less rigorous than today. By the time 
Kurth was writing (just three years later) he concluded that 
it is absolutely necessary for the zealot to obtain allies 
outside of the Navy because the Navy lacked the necessary 
forums to resolve disputes of this type. 
Rosen's model seems the most developed, and most 
useful. His peacetime model fits more cases than any other 
models considered. The only fault found in Rosen's models 
is that Rosen may have been too quick to classify military 
innovators as non-mavericks, or to dismiss their 
'Rear Admiral Meyer was a Captain when he was assigned as Aegis program 
ma.nage1·. 
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contributions. Rosen's own model for successful peacetime 
innovation relies on the actions of officers within the 
traditional structure of their service to promote the new 
ideas and methods. Perhaps Kurth and Davis' label--
"zealots" may be more palatable to Rosen than "maverick," 
but it remains that these middle grade innovation advocates 
made a difference in many case studies, and Rosen appears to 
ignore the contributions of these middle grade zealots. 
Rosen had the benefit of writing a historical 
description of some of the greatest innovations the world 
has ever seen. With the benefit of history, Rosen knew that 
the innovations he chose to examine had been battle-tested 
and their validity proven. Both carrier aviation and the 
Marine Corps' amphibious assault doctrine were enormously 
successful in World War II. They also altered their 
respective services forever. Rosen could have just as 
easily chosen innovations that died, or had far less impact. 
Rosen leaves it to others to see if his model of 
peacetime innovation can be applied today. He asserts that 
the United States focuses too much on a Five-Year Defense 
Plan, which it calls long term planning. Rosen claims true 
long-term planning looks twenty to thirty years ahead, the 
same period Admiral Owens and Andrew Marshall are pushing. 7 
a. Peacetime parallels with today 
Rosen observed that the "successful innovations he 
examined were initiated in periods of constrained resources 
at least as often as periods during which budgets were large 
and growing." 9 It is particularly noteworthy that the 
period in which the U.S. Navy transformed itself from a 
7 Rosen, Winning, 257. 
"Rosen, Winning, 57. 
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battleship navy to an aircraft carrier navy was one in which 
"naval budgets were modest and constrained by arms control 
agreements. The United States Marine Corps invented and 
developed a new form of amphibious warfare during the same 
period." q Rosen draws the conclusion that it is "may be 
wrong to focus on budgets when trying to understand or 
promote innovation." 1° Clearly buying huge quantities of 
hardware to support innovations can be terribly expensive. 
"But initiating an innovation and bringing it to the point 
where it provides a strategically useful option has been 
accomplished when money was tight." 11 
All of this points to the fact that the conditions 
that exist today do not impede innovation. It is not the 
money that fosters innovation. It is the determination of 
reform-minded officers within the respected core of their 
respective services that causes innovation. 
B. EFFICIENCY VERSUS INNOVATION 
Most of the authors cited in this study tried to 
distinguish between innovation and finding better or more 
efficient methods of accomplishing tasks. Webster's defines 
innovation as "the introduction of something new." 12 
Webster's also lists an archaic definition for innovate--"to 
effect a change in "-' To innovate literally means to 
create new methods and new ideas. Merely changing the 
method of doing something, even if the revised method is 
''Ibid., 252. 
10 Ibid. 
:_Webster's New Colleaiate Dictionarv (Springfield, MA: G. & c. Merriam 
Co., 1979), 590. 
"Ibid. 
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more efficient, is not necessarily innovating. Rear Admiral 
Kurth made a similar distinction between what he termed 
"incremental innovation" and "innovative departure." 14 To 
be successful in revolution requires an innovative 
departure. 
Some studies in the literature of naval innovations 
appear to have included innovations in its archaic sense; 
the cases they examined were actually examples of increasing 
-ficiency. Of the authors mentioned, the eases examined by 
__ ,____ 1, Posen, Signor and Rosen best illustrate innovation in 
l .cense. Davis, who wrote first, did not attempt to 
isol0ce true innovation from efficiency improvements the way 
thac Kurth and Rosen did. 
Since there is a great deal of political opposition to 
major innovations, Davis and Kurth both observed that some 
innovators tried to sell their innovation incrementally. 
Often this was because the "innovation" was actually an 
efficiency enhancement. 
Kurth and Rosen observed the modern military service 
seems forever intent on increasing efficiency. Continuing 
efficiency efforts results in evolutionary changes. It 
takes more than efforts to improve efficiency to result in 
revolutionary changes. 
1. Are today's changes innovations? 
For the purposes of this study, the term innovation 
refers to innovations in the same way Rosen described a 
major innovation, or the way Kurth described an innovative 
departure, that is, the revolutionary kind. Hayes and Smith 
et al., and Signor have chronicled two recent naval 
14Kurth, 2. 
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innovations--the introduction of cruise missiles and the 
Aegis combat system to the fleet 15 • 
In this era of defense budget cuts, the search for 
efficiencies endures, but what about newer innovations? 
Rosen concluded "the task of identifying the need for new 
military functions and capabilities, however, is very 
different than the search for military efficiency. Thinking 
about peacetime military innovation requires a focus on the 
next twenty to thirty years." 16 Few active duty officers 
have the luxury of planning that far in advance. 
Admiral William Owens, the Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and Andrew Marshall, the Director of the 
Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment are pushing forward 
thinking. Admiral Owens has revived the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Committee (JROC), and the services are complaining 
that Owens is attempting to influence decisions previously 
thought by the service chiefs to be their own exclusive 
domain. Owens is engaged in an ongoing battle with the Navy 
to retire several Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates early 
(a decision he supported in his previous billet, before his 
promotion to Vice Chairman of the JCS) and using the savings 
to fund RMA programs. 
Individual services are fighting innovation whenever it 
gets in the way of funding current forces. "Retired Marine 
Corps Commandant Al Gray characterized himself as being from 
the 'evolutionary school, not the revolutionary school. '" 17 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Boorda, who opposes 
the early retirement of the Perry class frigates, also urges 
an evolutionary pace for change. 
"'Hayes and Smith et al., wrote about both the introduction of cruise 
missiles and the Aegis combat system to the fleet. Signor covered the 




'"Pentagon Looks at Technology Revolution," Defense & Aerospace 
El..,ctronics, 11 Nov 1994, WESTLAW, 2707243. 
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-------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----------' 
.P.ndy Marsha 11 said that "the real changes from the RMA 
will be in military structure and new concepts and 
operation." 18 However, given institutional resistance, 
Marshall says the RMA may take as much as 30 years to occur, 
if it occurs in the U.S. at all. 19 
The pressure to improve efficiency rather than innovate 
is seductive. A "senior DOD official" quoted in the press, 
as having spoken only on the condition of anonymity, said 
that deep strike will be an essential RMA element. 20 As 
Captain Bognar's Naval War College Review article informed 
us, we are already reaching the current technological limits 
of range and speed, so deep strike may be just another 
efficiency improvement; and it may be a small improvement at 
that. On the other hand, if the deep strike capability is 
part of a larger package designed to take the battle away 
from u.s. forces to limit U.S. losses, then deep strike with 
precision guided munitions may be revolutionary. 
The same DOD official then described the DOD's Advanced 
Research Projects Agency's miniaturization efforts in the 
fields of computers and sensors. Making computers and 
sensors smaller does not threaten many jobs. Again, the 
energy in this part of the RMA is being directed at 
efficiency improvements. 
One area that appears to represent true revolution is 
the substitution of unmanned vehicles (UVs) in roles where 
manned platforms are used today. As one can imagine, the 
aviation community views UVs as a mixed blessing. Aviators 
welcome UVs such as Tomahawk missiles to attack with 
precision targets so highly defended that aircraft losses 
would be extremely high. Just as tank drivers in the Army 
!''Ibid. 
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are increasing seeing themselves as targets in the sights of 
highly lethal precision guided munitions, so to will 
aviators as extremely lethal anti-air weapons proliferate. 
Already anti-air missiles can fly significantly faster, and 
can execute maneuvers that manned aircraft cannot. The man 
in the loop is becoming the limiting factor. Initially, UVs 
will likely be used in their traditional role--
reconnaissance, but the potential revolution lies in 
expanding their roles to deliver ordnance on target. 
Careers in the U.S. Navy have traditionally been built 
around hardware that need to be manned. UVs still face a 
difficult path to deployment on a large scale. 
C. A NEW DOCTRINE AND A NEW STRATEGY FOR A CHANGING WORLD 
The strategy enunciated in Forward . From the Sea 
takes the Navy in a new direction--shoreward. To focus on 
events ashore instead of at sea is major shift for the Navy. 
It meets Rosen's definition of a major innovation--"a change 
in one of the primary combat arms of a service in the way it 
fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat 
arm. ": 1 The new strategy bumped anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) from the top of the Navy's priority list, where it 
resided for a generation. 
reductions in ASW forces, 
submarine patrol aircraft. 
Already we are seeing dramatic 
such as, the P-3 Orion anti-
Time will tell if today's 
strategy and resource decisions develop into a long-term 
focus. If the strategy is sustained over an extended 
period, career paths should develop soon. Resources and 
hardware should be put in place to ensure that the new 
strategy succeeds. 
The questions regarding the eventual success of the 
Navy's new doctrine are difficult to predict. Will the 
"'Rosen, Winning, 7. 
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doctrine being drafted by the newly established Naval 
Doctrine Command (NDC) be revolutionary? Since the Navy has 
operated so long without formal written doctrine, there are 
justifiable concerns among naval officers. After all, 
doctrine affects how we fight, train, exercise, organize, as 
well as what we buy, and how we plan. 
For the doctrine to succeed, it must keep pace with 
advancing technologies. This is complicated even for 
established doctrine commands. With NDC in its infancy, it 
is too soon to tell. The Hayes/Smith group at the Naval War 
College examined doctrine specifically in their study of 
naval innovation. Captain Bradd Hayes, U.S. Navy, writes, 
"if one thing stands out from the cases it is that 
doctrine invariably lags behind technological innovation." 22 
Since the RMA encompasses more than just technological 
innovations, the resulting doctrine is even more uncertain. 
One problem with doctrine is that, by definition, it is 
stagnant, not innovative. Webster's defines doctrine as, 
"something that is taught; a principle or position or the 
body of principles in a branch of knowledge or system of 
belief--dogma. "23 
Doctrine can drive innovation, but instances are rare. 
Retired U.S. Navy Commander James Tritten, of the Naval 
Doctrine Command (NDC) noted, 
in February 1984, the Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress, Fiscal Year 1985 
issued by then-Secretary of Defense Casper W. 
Weinberger, contained the programmatics for 
defending the United States with space-based 
defensive weapons. Since these weapons did not 
exist, we should not assume that a military 
doctrine for their employment currently 
existed. "24 
::::Hayes and Smith, 85. 
"''Webster's, 333. 
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When the decision was made to exploit new technologies 
permitting a space-based defensive system, it would have 
been irresponsible for the government not to explore 
doctrinal issues for their use. 
Current and emerging technologies influence military 
doctrine too. Emerging technology often renders existing 
doctrine obsolete, e.g., ICBMs, and cruise missiles 
replacing manned bombers for certain missions. As industry 
develops new technologies, often it will present ideas to 
the military who will then consider a doctrine for 
employment of such systems. 2 c, As a result of these 
complications, official naval doctrine will most assuredly 
lag operations until the Naval Doctrine Command is firmly 
established, and the vision of the RMA becomes more focused. 
D. WHAT CAN THE UNIFORMED MILITARY DO TO FOSTER INNOVATION? 
Captain Hayes and Commander Smith of the Naval War 
College addressed the issue in The Politics of Naval 
Innovation. They concluded, 
The key to success in future programs would appear 
to be concentration on technical as opposed to 
managerial competence in program oversight, 
creation of a "track" to develop career paths for 
"mavericks" to ensure they will be rewarded rather 
than ultimately punished for their dedication to 
technology competence, and concentration on as 
near as parallel development of doctrine and 
technology as can possibly be achieved. 21 
Another tact is to encourage thinking about the 
Revolution in Military Affairs. In the summer of 1994, the 
:
4James J. Tritten, "Naval Perspective For Military Doctrine 
Development" unpublished paper, May 1994, 7-8. 
c:'Ibid., 10-11. 
"''Hayes and Smith, 85. 
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Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment) and the 
National Defense University Foundation co-sponsored the 
first annual essay contest to encourage thinking on the RMA 
among JUnior officers (Major/Lieutenant Commander and 
below) . Winners will have their essays published in Joint 
Force Ouartel·ly. 
1. Captain Signor's Lessons 
Captain Signor provided succinct "lessons for the 
future" in his June 1994 paper, "Cruise Missiles for the 
U.S. Navy: an Exemplar of Innovation in a Military 
Organization." 27 First, "anticipate dissent. It is rare 
time when members of a large organization share a common 
vision of the future. "28 In addition to warning military 
officers to expect dissent, Captain Signor warns, "it would 
be wise not to stake the Navy's future on any one vision of 
the future or any particular weapon system. "29 
Next, Captain Signor points out that innovation takes 
time. In the cruise missile case that he studied, the 
concept of an "aerial torpedo was on the drawing board ln 
1917, and it took until 1967 for Harpoon to fly. Patience 
is a virtue. 30 
Third, Captain Signor recommends that resources for 
innovation be stabilized; it smooths the process. The 
cruise missile program suffered by a "feast or famine" 
funding environment. 31 
"'Philip W. Signor, Cruise Missiles for the U.S. Navv: An Exemplar of 
Innovation in a Military Organization (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 1994) 1 
97. 
28Ibid. 
"'Ibid. I 98. 
'''Ibid. I 99-100. 
Jiibid. 1 100 • 
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Next, he cautions, Be prepared for failure. In the 
cruise missile history he studied, there were more than ten 
cruise missile projects that never produced a weapon 
suitable for deployment. 32 
Fifth, Captain Signor repeats a lesson that, Kurth and 
others discovered--the zealots need protection. Captain 
Signor suggests active commitment through vertical 
alliances, "or, at a minimum, a studied neutrality, ensuring 
that all parties to a professional controversy are treated 
fairly. 33 
Lastly, Captain Signor suggests that naval leaders 
"avoid organizational myopia," use foresight to consider the 
future nature of war, and future roles and missions. 34 
Captain Signor has partially answered the question of 
whether future innovations will succeed by addressing what 
should be done by naval leaders to foster innovation. 
Captain Signor's solution meshes remarkably well with the 
findings of Davis, Kurth and Rosen. 
2 . Timing of Innovations 
Thus far, this paper has addressed the innovation 
process, the military technological revolution that may 
enable a revolution in military affairs. How does it all 
fit together? Timing is critical. The wrong innovation at 
the wrong time is a waste of precious resources. Signor 
wrote, "innovation is successful when technology, together 




4Ibid. I 102 
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the new t fcchn::)1ogy, is available to the operating forces at 




The unresisting progress of mankind causes continual 
change in the weapons, and with that must come a 
continual change in the manner of fighting. 
A. T. Mahan 
Military innovation is being driven and encouraged by 
many of today's civilian and military leaders. The Pentagon 
has recently appointed a task force on 
"Fostering/Institutionalizing Long Term Innovation." 
Guidance and direction are being provided from the top, but 
the outcome is uncertain. The fact that a task force on 
institutionalizing innovation had to be appointed is 
evidence of the difficulties involved in innovation. 
Several models exist that seek to explain how military 
innovation occurs. No single model tells us how to 
innovate, although Steven Rosen's model appears to be the 
most consistent with recent innovative experiences. 
Although the models vary a certain degree of consensus does 
exist. 
The consensus Vlew is well represented by Naval Reserve 
Captain Philip Signor, who gives us the lessons for future 
innovative success. First, anticipate dissent, because a 
large organization will have differing views of future 
conflict. Second, innovation is often a time consuming 
process. Third, the process is not smooth; expect peaks and 
valleys. Fourth, zealots are necessary for true innovation, 
and they require protection. Lastly, think big--avoid 
organizational myopia. 
The innovation process can be enhanced by a better 
understanding of the politics involved. Military 
organizations seem willing to innovate so long as it does 
not disrupt anything, but true innovation is bound to be 
disruptive. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has 
embraced a revolutionary strategy. It is too early to tell 
whether the innovation in strategy will result in a 
revolutionary doctrine. No other changes undertaken in the 
last several years are a as monumental as those cited by 
Rosen, however, there are innovations being contemplated 
such as, unmanned aircraft taking over some manned-aircraft 
missions, which could have as broad impact as the Navy's 
decision to integrate aviation before World War II. 
What lies ahead? That depends on the success of 
contemplated innovations. If the Navy's current littoral 
focus proves to be more than a passing trend, the Navy must 
focus resources, and ensure a viable career path ~xists for 
junior officers to succeed in the new field of littoral 
warfare. 
Will the RMA succeed? As with all innovation, success 
or failure depends on the emergence of advocates or zealots 
who will push their innovation in the face of huge 
opposition, and even when their own careers are threatened. 
Andrew Marshall says, 
the big difference between the winners and the 
losers is not in the technologies they have, but 
some guys got the right idea. They made the 
organizational changes, and did the right kind of 
training, to get a tremendous advantage over those 
who did not. 1 
If the Revolution in Military Affairs occurs, what are 
the possibilities? A battle environment with near real-
time, near-perfect knowledge available to commanders; 
perhaps a new generation of cheap, smart, stealthy, missiles 
e.g., "Super Tomahawks," that will do much of the shore 
1Andrew Marshall quoted in Robert Holzer and Stephen C. LaSueur, "A 
Revolution on War Tactics: Pentagon Gathers Ideas For Future Battlefields," 
Nav_r Times, 13 June 1994, AOL. 
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bombardment job better and more cheaply than aircraft; 
wings of stealth aircraft protecting fleets and ground 
forces. 
It is difficult to find zealots for new concepts, 
systems, and ideas that compete directly with a major 
mission of one of the Navy's three "unions." Perhaps the 
efforts of Admiral Owens and Andrew Marshall will dull the 
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